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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - LABOR LAW - RECENT RAMIFICATIONS
OF THE APPLICATION OF FREE SPEECH DOCTRINES TO THE PROTECTION OF PICKETING - When the United States Supreme Court declared that peaceful picketing was protected by the constitutional guaranty of free speech, it raised the interesting question how the doctrines
shielding the traditional modes of free speech were to be adapted to
the preservation of picketing. A smooth cloaking of the right to picket
with the sanctity of a constitutionally protected civil liberty is complicated by various factors such as the ease with which picketing may lead
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to violence, the elements of economic coercion inherent in even peaceful
picketing, and the detrimental repercussions upon strangers to the controversy.1 As a result the clash between constitutional right and state
police power usually is more severe when freedom of speech takes the
form of a picket line than when it is exercised through other mediums.
The pertinent question is whether these difficulties are to be considered the necessary consequence of safeguarding a constitutional right,
or whether they are reasons for modifying or altering the free speech
doctrines. Some indication of the solution to the problem may be contained in recent Supreme Court decisions, particularly the case of Carpenters & Joiners Union of America, Local 2I3 'V. Ritter's Cafe.2
I.

In the Thornhill and Carlson cases,3 which establish picketing as a
constitutional right, the Court gave no indication that picketing was to
be treated differently from any other method of disseminating information. The danger of injury to private interests was not considered
a reason for imposing sweeping restrictions upon the right to picket/
State power to preserve the peace was said to justify a restraint upon
picketing "only where the clear danger of sub~tantive evils arises under
circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merit of ideas by
competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion." 5
In American Federation of Labor v. Swingti the Court reiterated
the views of the Thornhill and Carlson cases by holding that a state's
common-law policy condemning picketing in the absence of an employer-employee relationship could not form the basis for a prohibition
of peaceful picketing. That the protection of private rights was not a
reason for infringing the guarantee of free speech was expressed in the
statement that peaceful picketers could not be enjoined "because of
concern for the economic interests against which they are seeking to
enlist public opinion." 7
1 For a presentation of some difficulties arising from extending the free speech
guarantee doctrine to picketing, see Gregory, "Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of
Speech," 26 A. B. A. J. 709 (1940), and l TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING, § 136 (1940).
2
(U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 607. The other cases are Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance, Local No. 122 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, (U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 706, and Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers, Local
802 v. Wohl, (U.S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 816.
3
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 746 (1940). See 39 MICH. L. REv. II0 (1940).
~Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 105, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940). Nor is the
fact that the information may be disseminated at places other than the scene of the
labor dispute a justification of the restriction.
5
Id., 310 U. S. at 104-105.
7
6
312 U. S. 321, 61 S. Ct. 568 (1941).
Id., 312 U.S. at 326.
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From a prima facie tort requiring justification,8 these cases elevated
picketing to the· status o-f a constitutional right beyond the ordinary
exercise of the state police power. A measure which restrains picketing
enjoys no presumption of constituticinality,9 and is subjected to the close
judicial scrutiny accorded restrictions upon civil liberties.
An extreme to which the constitutional guarantee does not extend
was disclosed in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies.10
The Court held that when blended with violence picketing lost its constitutional immunity, and could be restrained by a blanket injunction
in order to preserve the public peace. This decision may be regarded
as merely an application of the "clear and present danger test" referred
to in the Thornhill case,11 and as involving no departure from the
traditional doctrines protecting free speech.
By emphasizing the fact that the exercise of a constitutional right
was enjoined because of past abuses of the right, it is possible to view
the Meadowmoor case as introducing an innovation. Precedent for
enjoining lawful conduct to insure the prohibition of unlawful activity
is contained in several state decisions which recognize peaceful picketing as lawful but enjoin peaceful picketing, as well as the accompanying acts of violence, in order to maintain the public peace.12 In these
cases peaceful picketing was -admitted to be a lawful act, but not a
constitutional right; While lawful acts can be enjoined in the interest
of the public welfare, constitutional rights are on a higher plane. Since
there seems to be no other authority for restraining a civil liberty because of past abuses of the right, or because of unlawful acts accompanying the exercise of the right, the Meadowmoor case may be re. garded as treating a constitutional right on the same footing as a mere
lawful act.13 At least it is a recognition that when the unrestrained exercise of the constitutional right to picket conflicts with the power of a
state to preserve the peace and property, more stringent restrictions
may be imposed upon this constitutional right than have been placed
upon the exercise of other civil liberties.
8 See Cooper, "The Fiction of Peaceful Picketing," 35 M1cH. L. REv. 73 (1936),
and 1 TELLER, LABOR D1sPUTES AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING, § II4 (1940), for
the strict attitude toward picketing assumed by some courts.
9 See 40 CoL. L. REv. 531 (1940).
10 312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
11 See note 5, supra, and I BILL OF R1GHTS REv. 217 (1941).
12 132 A. L. R. 1218 (1941) .contains an annotation of the cases enjoining all
picketing on the ground that the dispute has been attended by violence or other concededly unlawful conduct, including a discussion of the leading case of Nann v. Raimist,
255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931).
18 That peaceful picketing should not oe enjoined because of past acts of violence
is the basis of Justice Reed's dissent in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 at 317, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941).
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The Meadowmoor case is far from a complete repudiation of the
applicability of the constitutional guarantee to peaceful picketing.
Picketing cannot be restrained as if it were not a constitutional right.
While the prohibition of activity other than a civil liberty may be warranted if the restriction is reasonably adapted to the prevention of an
evil such as violence, a stronger justification probably is required to
uphold a blanket injunction against picketing.14 To come within the
scope of the Meadowmoor case there must be a rather livid record of
related acts of violence intermingled with the picketing. There is
nothing in the case upon which to justify a prohibition of all picketing
because it is accompanied by acts which in themselves are not violent,
but which the state fears may lead to violence.15 An ounce of prevention
is not worth a pound of cure when a constitutional right is the subject
of regulation.
The state courts have not employed the doctrine of the Meadowmoor case as the basis for indiscriminate enjoining of picketing. In but
two cases reaching state appellate courts has all picketing been enjoined
because of violence,16 and only one case may be considered as straining
the limits of the doctrine. 11 In that decision the California Supreme
Court upheld a blanket injunction based on a record of vile and abusive
language, and threats of violence, but little if any actual violence. The
case would probably be reversed by the United States Supreme Court,
unless threats of violence, or acts which tend toward violence, are considered the equivalent of actual violence.
2.

Although there must be a record of considerable violence to warrant the imposition of a blanket injunction against peaceful picketing,
considerably less violence is sufficient to justify an injunction which
merely restrains the violent acts, but permits peaceful picketing. Such
was the holding in Hotel & Restaurant Employees' lnternationalAl14 See 40 CoL. L. REv. 531 (1940) for a comparison of the difference in the
attitude of the Court when dealing with a measure restricting a civil right, and with a
restriction of an economic right.
16 It would be difficult to reconcile such a view with the emphasis placed on the
many acts of actual violence by the majority opinion, and the vigor of the dissenting
opinions.
16 Euclid Candy Co. of California v. International Longshoremen & Warehousemen's Union, (Cal. App. 1942) 121 P. (2d) 91; Steiner v. Long Beach Local No.
128, (Cal. 1942) 10 L. R. R. 169. For examples of cases refusing blanket injunction,
but granting limited injunction against the unlawful acts, see Isolantite, Inc. v. United
Electrical Radio & Machine Workers of America, (N. J. Ch. 1941) 22 A. (2d) 796;
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett District Council of Lumber & Sawmill Workers,
(Wash. 1941) u9 P. (2d) 643.
17 Steiner v. Long Beach Local No. 128, (Cal. 1942) 10 L. R. R. 169.
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liance, Local No. I22 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. 18
The Court sustained an injunction based on the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act 19 which, as interpreted by the Wisconsin court,20 declared that violent acts of picketing were enjoinable as unfair labor
practices. The Supreme Court carefully pointed out that neither the
statute nor the restraining order prohibited peaceful picketing. 21
Attributing such a meaning to a statute, which says that it is vnlawful to co-operate in picketing unless a majority of the employees
have voted to call strike 22 is the result of some judicious interpretation on the part of the Wisconsin court. Since the majority vote provision is a nullity if the act is limited to violent picketing,23 it seems clear
that the legislature hoped the statute would be constitutionally applicable to the peaceful picketing by a minority of employees. The Employment Relations Board undoubtedly thought it was enjoining peaceful picketing as evidenced by its order to desist from "engaging in
promoting or inducing picketing." 24 Thus the Wisconsin court sacrificed
legislative and administrative objectives for the sake of constitutionality.
Since the Supreme Court must accept the state court's interpretation of its statutes and court orders, the decision is sound, and is no impingemen_t upon the doctrine of the Thornhill and Carlson cases. But
as a practical matter, before the Wisconsin court determined that the
statute and the injunction were to be given a meaning other than that
indicated by the normal interpretation of the statutory language, the

a

(U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 706.
Laws (1939), c. 57, Stat. (1941), § III.OJ et seq. See'28 VA. L. REv.
265 (1941) for a discussion of some state labor relations acts, including the Wisconsin
act. Annotations on the validity of ordinances against picketing are found in 130
A. L. R. 1303 (1941); 125 A. L. R. 963 (1940).
20 Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance, Local No. 122 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 236 Wis. 329, 294 N. W. 632, 295 N. W. 634
(1941).
21 Hotel & Restaurant Employees' International Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board, (U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 706 at 708. It is reiterated in Justice Reed's
dissenting opinion in Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, (U. S. 1942) IO
U. S. L. W. 4293 at 429 5 :2.
22 Wis. Laws (1939), c. 57, Stat. (1941), § 111.06(2): "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employe individually or in concert with others. . . (e) To cooperate in engaging in, promoting or inducing picketing, boycotting or any other overt
concomitant of a strike unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the employes
of an employer against whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call a strike."
23 A majority vote could not authorize violent picketing, and so interpreted the
act does not apply to peaceful picketing even in the absence of a majority vote.
24 The injunction is set out in note I of the Supreme Court decision, (U. S.
1942) 62 S.. Ct. 706 at 707.
18

19 Wis.

1942
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injunction and statute constituted "an overhanging and undefined threat
to free utterance." 25
The latest Supreme Court pronouncements upon the constitutional
right to picket are the decisions in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers,
Local 802 v. Wohl, 26 and Carpenters & Joiners Union of America,
Local 2r3 v. Ritter's Cafe. 21 By a unanimous opinion, the first case
reversed a decision of the New York Court of Appeals 28 sustaining an
injunction which, in addition to restraining a bakery drivers union from
picketing the manufacturing bakers who sold to peddlers against whom
the union was making demands, also prohibited the union from picketing the retailers who purchased from the peddlers. The objective of
the union was to induce the pe9-dlers, who hired no employees and
owned their own trucks, to employ a helper one day a week. In a short
opinion the New York court had granted the injunction solely on the
ground that there was no "labor dispute" within the ban of the state
anti-injunction act. The New York decisions contained no discussion
of picketing as protected by the right of free speech.
In view of the holding in the Swing case that the definition of a
labor dispute cannot be so narrowly drawn as to infringe upon the
right to picket,2° it is not surprising that the Supreme Court struck
down an injunction granted by a state court because there was no labor
dispute as defined by state law. The Wohl case is primarily a reminder
to state courts that the imposition of restraints on picketing involves a
federal question as well as problems of state law. A state decision
which grants a blanket injunction should show some consideration for
the right to picket as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Perhaps the most significant statement in the case is the recognition
of Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion that
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very
presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another,
quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being dis25
The quotation is taken from Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 at 292, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941), where the Court
compares the merits of the injunction in question with the abstract statute.
26
(U.S. 1942) IOU. S. L. W. 4287.
27
(U.S. 1942) IOU. S.L. W. 4293.
28
Wohl v. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802, (S. Ct. 1939) 14
N. Y. S. (2d) 198, affd. 259 App. Div. 868, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 8II (1940), affd.
284 N. Y. 788, 31 N. E. (2d) 765 (1940). In both decisions of the case the court
sustained the injunction with the mere statement that there was no labor dispute:
under the anti-injunction act. Further history of the case is contained in the Supreme
Court decision.
29 American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 at 326, 61 S. Ct. 568
(1941).

1206

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

seminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it the subject
of restrictive regulation." 30
This is the first clear-cut declaration by the Supreme Court that picketing may create difficulties warranting special regulatory measures, which
probably are not justified when freedom of speech is exercised in other
ways.
The five-four decision in Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's
Cafe ranks in significance with the- Meadowmoor case in marking out
the limits of the right to picket. The case upholds a Texas injunction
restraining a carpenters union from peacefully picketing a restaurant
because the owner had contracted for the construction of another restaurant with a contractor who used nonunion labor. The state court
had enjoined the picketing as a violation of the state antitrust act. 31
A majority of the Court upheld the injunction on the ground that a
state can draw a line "in confining the area of unrestricted industrial
warfare" so as to "localize industrial conflict by prohibiting the exertion
of concerted economic pressure directed at the business, wholly outside
the economic context of the real dispute, of a person whose relation to
the dispute arises from his business dealings with one of the disputants." 32 The Court expressly approves what it terms the prevailing
policy of the states to prohibit the disputants from conscripting neutrals
having no relation to either the dispute or the industry in which it
arose.

3.
These recent developments warrant a brief review of the present
status of the constitutional right to picket. What limitations may be
imposed upon the right in addition to measures necessary for the preservation of the peace, and how does picketing compare in this respect with
the traditional modes of free speech?
Any discussion of the subject probably should be prefaced by a
determination of the activities which are included within the constitutional right to picket. Not every activity which may be classified as
picketing is an exercise of the right of free speech. The Thornhill and
subsequent cases state that the Constitution guarantees "the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute," and picketing when employed for this purpose is within the guarantee,88 Not
so (U. S. 1942) IO U. S. L. W. 4287 at 4289:i.
31 Carpenter & Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
149 S. W. (2d) 69432 (U. S. 1942) IO U. S. L. W. 4293 at 4294:1.
33 "In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information concerning
the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that
is guaranteed by the Constitution." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 at 102,
60 S. Ct. 736 ( I 940). This statement is quoted in the subsequent picketing cases.
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every picket has to carry a placard, since the presence of a picket indicates the existence of a labor dispute. But pickets in excess of a number reasonably necessary to impart the facts of a dispute may not be a
means of exercising the right of free speech.84 Similarly, the "synthetic''
picketing enjoined by a California court was not for the purpose of disclosing the facts of a dispute, so undoubtedly was not within the Fourteenth Amendment. 85 That the primary objective of the picketing was
not the promulgation of information concerning the controversy may
explain the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the case of Carpenter Baking Co. v. Bakery Sales Drivers' Local,86 in which an evenly
divided Wisconsin court upheld an injunction based on findings that the
union had attempted to persuade persons not to deal with a certain
employer. The Supreme Court might have reacted differently if the
union had been disseminating the facts of a labor dispute which had
merely the incidental effect of dissuading customers.
Judicial statements such as the one in the Ritter's Cafe case can
best be explained on the ground that certain picketing activities are not
free speech. In that case Justice Reed, although di~senting, said,
" ... Wedo not doubt the right of the state to impose not only
some but many restrictions upon peaceful picketing. Reasonable
numbers, quietness, truthful placards, open ingress and egress,
suitable hours or other proper limitations, not destructive of the
right to tell of labor difficulties, may be required." 81
Such restrictions certainly are not justifiable as necessary to the prevention of violence, so are not within the doctrine of the Meadowmoor
and Hotel Employees cases.88 Permitting the imposition of any regulatory measures upon picketing provided they do not interfere with
disseminating the facts of a dispute is just another way of saying that
34 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 99, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940), states that
the statute in question "leaves room for no exceptions based upon ••• the number of
persons engaged." Justice Reed's dissent in Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. -287 at 319, 61 S. Ct. 552 (1941), says that the
number of pickets may "be limited, let us say, to two or three individuals at a time .•••"
People v. Levner, (N. Y. City Ct. 1941) 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 487, states that 250 pickets
transcends dissemination of information.
85 Crandell v. Thrifty Drug Stores Co., (Cal. Super. 1941) 5 LAB. CAS., 1f
60,846. The pickets proceeded a short distance ahead of delivery trucks, picketing
retail stores until the trucks passed, on the excuse that to enter the stores would necessitate crossing a picket line.
86 (Wis. 1941) 299 N. W. 30, cert. den. Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No.
344 v. Carpenter Baking Co., (U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 904.
81 (U.S. 1942) 10 U.S. L. W. 4293 at 4296:1.
88 Unless the Court extends the doctrine of these cases to include activities which
tend toward violence.

1208

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

the constitutional guarantee only covers picketing which makes known
the facts of a controversy.
Requiring picketing to impart information before it deserves the
protection of the Constitution is not imposing any discriminatory restrictions upon picketing. The same is true of other modes of expression. That free speech does not include all verbal utterances is indicated
in the recent Supreme Court case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,89
in which the Court said that certain classes of speech are not w;ithin the
constitutional guarantee because "such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas."
Of course, conveying information by picketing is subject to the same
restrictions as any other exercise of free speech. Fraudulent or slanderous statements when published by picketing may be the basis of a damage action and the fraudulent elements probably are enjoinable, just
as if the statements were published in a newspaper. 40 The Thornhill case
expressly states that the "character and the accurateness of the terminology used in notifying the public of the facts of the dispute" are
subject to regulation/1
4,•
Assuming that the picketing is a sufficient dissemination of information, is truthful, and is peaceful, what limitations may be imposed?
The question probably can be reduced to the proposition of what relationship, if any, must exist between the pickets and the person picketed
before the picketing is sheltered by the Constitution.
It is not certain whether the picketing guaranteed by the Constitution is just that carried on in connection with a labor dispute,4 2 or
whether it is picketing in the furtherance of any cause.43 If the former,
the relationship of the parties is the primary factor in determining the
existence of a labor dispute. If the Fourteenth Amendment encom(U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 766 at 769.
Equity finds some difficulty in enjoining publication although the publication
is sufficiently defamatory to ground a damage action. See Pound, "Equitable Relief
Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality," 29 HARV. L. REv. 640 (1916).
Some courts will issue an injunction where there is damage to a property right, 36
MICH. L. REv. 1206 (1938), and picketing certainly impinges upon property rights.
The question is more one of the policy of a particular equity court than a constitutional
question, since the Supreme Court in the Meadowmoor case did not point out any
threats to free speech inherent in an injunction. See also I TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, § 126 ( 1940).
41 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 99, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940).
42 1 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 67 (1941 supp.),
claims that the constitutional guarantee applies only to picketing in connection with
a labor dispute.
48 41 CoL. L. REv. 90 ( 1941) states that the doctrine of the Thornhill case
applies to nonlabor picketing as well as to that in connection with a labor dispute.
89

40
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passes nonlabor picketing as well, there probably must be some relationship between the pickets and the picketed to justify the singling out of
a particular person to bear the brunt of the burden created by another's
exercise of a constitutional right. 44 In either event, the relationship of
the parties may be regarded as the essence of the problem.
In the Swing case, the Court decided that there need not be an
employer-employee relationship to justify the picketing. The Meadowmoor case inferred that, if done peacefully, a union could conduct a
secondary boycott by picketing the retailers of the product manufactured by the firm against whom the union had asserted its demands." 11
The Wohl case reversed the granting of an injunction against secondary
picketing, which indicates that such picketing is within the constitutional
guarantee.4° Although the Wohl case may be a weak authority because
of the New York court's summary treatment of the question, any doubt
as to the legality of secondary picketing is dispelled by the portion of
the Ritter's Cafe case in which the majority distinguishes the Wohl
case by pointing out that the retailers in the latter decision were directly
involved in the dispute. 47
•
Before the Ritter's Cafe case, there was no authority with which to
refute the proposition that there was sufficient relationship between the
parties if the union believed that the picketing of the particular person
was necessary to promote its interest. This is the view expressed by
Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in the Ritter's Cafe case, where
he stated that there is
" ... no reason why members of the public should be deprived of
any opportunity to get information which might enable them to
H A union undoubtedly could not picket a place of business which was a total
stranger to the claims of the union, even though such picketing disseminated facts of
some other dispute, and the union made no false statements about the place picketed.
In this extreme form, the situation is academic, but illustrates the point that there at
least must be some remote relationship between the picketers and the place of business
which has been singled out as the scene of the picketing.
45
Maywood Farms Co. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, (Ill. App. 1942) 9
L. R. R. 718, says that the Meadowmoor case did not definitely decide that a court
cannot enjoin a peaceful secondary boycott, but then points out that subsequent Illinois
cases have held that a boycott is not secondary unless there is violence.
46 The injunction restrained the union from picketing either the place of business
of manufacturing bakers who sold to the respondent or the places of business of their

customers.
47 "The line drawn by Texas in this case is not the line drawn by New York in
the Wohl case. The dispute there related to the conditions under which bakery products were sold and delivered to retailers. The business of the retailers was therefore
directly involved in the dispute. In picketing the retail establishments the union members would only be following the subject-matter of their dispute." Carpenters & Joiners
Union v. Ritter's Cafe, (U. S. 1942) IO U. S. L. W. 4293 at 4294:1-2. This is
similar to the New York "unity of interest" doctrine. See Goldfinger v. Feintuch,
276 N. Y. 281, II N. E. (2d) 910 (1937), and 131 A. L. R. 1068 (1941).
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use their influence to tip the scales in favor of the side they think
is right....
"Whatever injury the respondent suffered here resulted from
the peaceful and truthful statements made to the public that he
had employed a hon-union contractor to erect a building." 48
Thus, three and probably four members of the Court 49 are. of the
opinion that the only necessity for a relationship between the pickets
and the picketed is that the promulgated facts relate to the picketed
person. In other words, the picketed person is sufficiently connected
with the controversy if the disseminated facts of the dispute can truthful}-y accuse him of directly or indirectly violating some interest of the
umon.
However, the majority decision, in the Ritter's Cafe case, that the
guarantee of free speech does not prevent the confining of picketing
"to the area of the industry within which a labor dispute arises," 50
established the requirement that the picketer and the person picketed be
related to the same industry, and share interdependent economic interests. Such a relationship is lacking where the picketer is in the
building trade, and the picketed person is engaged in the restaurant
business. According to the majority, each industry constitutes a separate sphere for the purposes of picketing, and both parties to a dispute
must be in the same sphere. In contrast, Justice Black holds that the
proper sphere for picketing is the entire nationwide controversy between union and nonunion systems of employment.51
The principal difficulty in the Ritter's Cafe case is discovering the
exact basis for the limitation imposed by the majority. A possible explanation is that a union is not justified in picketing a particular person who
is not the primary disputant, unless he is sufficiently connected with the
controversy to warrant being burdened with the picketing. This theory
fails to explain why it is permissible to picket the retailers of the product
manufactured by the person against whom the union is making demands, while it is not permissible to picket the person who has contracted with the one against whom the union is asserting its demands.
The retailer of a nonunion product may obtain the advantage of acquiring the product at a lower price which may enable him to undersell
retailers of the union product. But he who contracts with a person using
nonunion labor may receive the benefit of a lower price resulting from
48 Carpenters & Joiners
4293 at 4296:2, 4297:i.
49 Justices Douglas and
Reed wrote a separate dissent
5°Carpenters & Joiners
4293 at 4294:2.
51 Id. 4296:2.

Union v. Ritter's Cafe, (U. S. 1942)

IO

U. S. L. W.

Murphy concurred with Justice Black's dissent. Justice
which is very similar to that of Justice Black.
Union v. Ritter's Cafe, (U. S. 1942) IO U. S. L. W.

1942}
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lower nonunion wages. Similarly, both contribute to the continuation of
the condition the union desires to remedy. If no one sells the nonunion
product, the nonunion competition will be eliminated, but the same will
be true if nobody contracts with a user of nonunion labor.
Consequently, the personal demerit of the person picketed cannot
be the primary factor in justifying a limitation upon the permissible
area of picketing. In spite of Justice Black's statement to the contrary,52
the majority opinion in the Ritter's Cafe case does not hold, in repudiation of the Thornhill case, that private injury is a reason for restricting
a constitutional right. The Court's attitude is expressed by the statement,
" ... Where, as here, claims on behalf of free speech are met with
claims on behalf of the authority of the state to impose reasonable
regulations in behalf of the community as a whole, the duty of this
Court is plain. Whenever state action is challenged as a denial of
'liberty,' the question always is whether the state has violated 'the
essential attributes of that liberty.'" 58
When acting in the interest of the public, the state can restrict picketing
provided the constitutional right, in the opinion of the Court, is not
substantially impaired. But the same limitation imposed as a protection
of private rights may not be justified. If the appellant had appealed
the Texas court's first decision in the Ritter's Cafe case,54 in which an
induced breach of a private contract was the basis of the injunction, the
Supreme Court might have held differently.
While the Texas antitrust act may be important as an indication
that the picketing is being restricted in the public interest, the fact that
the picketing violates the statute is not in itself a justification for the
injunction. If picketing such as that in the Swing case were held to be
a breach of the antitrust act, the Texas court could not enjoin it. 55 The
Supreme Court has not adopted the end or object test for determining
the legality of picketing. 56 In fact, a statutory basis for a restriction of
s2
GS

Id. at 4297:1.
Id. at 4294:1.

H Carpenters & Joiners Union of America v. Ritter's Cafe, (Tex. Civ. App.
1940) 138 S. W. (2d) 223.
55 The holding in the New York case of People v. Masiello, 177 Misc. 608, 31
N. Y. S. (2d) 512 (1941), is undoubtedly erroneous. The court enjoined a union
of newspaper dealers, who had demands against several newspapers, from picketing
dealers of the newspapers on the ground that it was a breach of the state anti-injunction
act.
56 In the Wohl case the Court expressly avoided passing on the effect of an unlawful objective by holding that the New York court had not adequately certified that
such was the basis of the injunction. On the objectives test in general, see I TELLER,
LABoR D1sPUTES AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING,§ 114 (1940); 90 UN1v. PA. L. REv.
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picketing may not be necessary. The Texas injunction probably would
have been upheld if it had been granted for the public good under the
inherent power of equity, although it is possible that the Court may
require a legislative mandate before it will sanction a restriction on
picketing short of a prevention of violence.
This distinction between the promotion of a public interest and the
protection of private rights may establish a theoretical rather than a
practical limitation. If the Supreme Court abides by such a distinction,
a state court can comply with it by specifically basing the injunction on
the attainment of public good, since any picketing which injures a private right also has community-wide repercussions. The incidental benefit to the involved private property interests will be just as complete
as though this were stated to be the sole objective of the restriction.
Any consideration of the Ritter's Cafe case makes it apparent that
there is no precise solution for the question why the Court held that the
constitutional right to picket can be confined to a particular economic
area. The only possible answer is that a majority of the Court was of
the opinion that the dictates of sound public policy preclude the constitutional sanctity from extending beyond picketing in a controversy
in which both the picketers and the parties picketed are members of the
same general industry. What is to be the test for determining the boundaries of particular industries is not contained in the decision.
The holding cannot be explained by pointing to parallel situations
of restraints upon free speech exercised through means other than picketing. The necessity for such a restriction had never before arisen
because the demands of one person upon another made through ordinary mediums of speech do not have the far-reaching effect upon third
persons that results from an assertion of the demands by picketing. Consequently, the decision in effect is a recognition on the part of the
majority of th~ Court that picketing creates problems which are nonexistent in the exercise of the traditional forms of free speech. Furthermore, the majority holds that these difficulties warrant the imposition
of limitations upon a constitutional right hitherto not considered necessary. While the minority, as exemplified by Justice Douglas,57 recognizes that picketing raises peculiar problems, it is less ready to use them
for justifying the restriction of picketing, and is more likely to regard
201 at 209-2II (1941). An authority for the proposition that free speech may be
restricted because it advocates the breach of a statute (an illegal purpose) the breach of
which would not constitute a clear and present danger, is found in the case of Fox
v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 35 S. Ct. 383 (1915). In that case Justice Holmes upheld a prosecution under a statute making it unlawful to publish inducements to violate
laws. The statute in question prohibited indecent exposure.
57 See note 30, supra.
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the difficulties as merely the consequences which must be endured in the
interest of maintaining a constitutional right. 58
At least the majority opinion is evidence that picketing is not an
absolute right which can only be restricted when it constitutes a clear
and present danger to the existence or peace of the state. Even the
minority hints that there may be some interest of the state, short of
the prevention of violence, which may warrant reasonable restrictions.511
But neither the majority nor the minority present any clear guides for
predicting the basis and extent of additional permissible limitations
upon the right to picket.

William H. Kinsey

58 As evidenced by Justice Black's statement in his dissent in the Ritter's Cafe
case, IO U. S. L. W. 4293 at 4297:1, "Whatever injury the respondent suffered here
resulted from the peaceful and truthful statements made to the public that he had
employed a non-union contractor to erect a building."
59 Justice Black intimates that the state can regulate picketing in the interest of
regulating the use of its streets. Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, (U. S.
1942) IO U. S. L. W. 4293 at 4297:1. See also quotation from Justice Reed at note
37, supra.

